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The  expanding  relationships  between  industry  and 
medicine have produced great benefits.  [1] [2] In-
dustry support for medical research has led to impor-
tant  therapeutic  breakthroughs.  Such  support  has 
helped medical education at all levels. Academic re-
search,  in  turn,  has  provided  industry  with  many 
basic  ideas  that  lead  to  the  development  of  new 
drugs and medical devices. However, as these rela-
tionships  have  grown,  the  conflict  between  the  fi-
nancial goals of industry and the professional goals 
of medicine is creating significant risks for not only 
the profession but also the public. [3] [4] [5] What 
should be the primary goals of medicine—high qual-
ity  research,  responsible  patient  care  and  excellent 
medical  education—may  be  compromised  by  the 
undue pursuit of financial gain. That tension is what 
policies for regulating conflicts of interests should be 
designed to control.   
  
The Concept of Conflict of Interest 
A conflict of interest is a set of circumstances that 
are  reasonably  believed  to  create  a  substantial  risk 
that professional judgment of a primary interest will 
be unduly influenced by a secondary interest. [6] [7] 
The  primary  interest  refers  to  the  purpose  of  the 
professional activity, such as the welfare of patients 
or the quality of research. The secondary interest is 
typically financial gain. The belief about the risk of 
the effects of the conflict is based on past experience 
in other relevant cases.  
To avoid common misunderstandings of the con-
cept that can lead to misplaced and ultimately inef-
fective policies, it is important to appreciate the sig-
nificance of each of these three main elements of a con-
flict of interest.  
The primary interest that conflict of interest policies 
seek to protect varies according to the purpose of the 
activity. The interests include maintaining the integrity 
of research, the welfare of patients, and the quality of 
the t r a i n i n g  o f  m e d i c a l  s t u d e n t s  a n d  t h e  c o ntinuing 
education  of physicians. These should be the  primary 
interest both for individuals in a professional role and 
for any medical institution. Describing exactly what the 
primary interest is for professionals and for various in-
stitutions may be controversial. Sometimes primary in-
terests may conflict with each other (the welfare of the 
patients in a research protocol and the successful com-
pletion of the research, for example).  But whatever the 
primary interests are, the point of regulating conflicts of 
interest  is  to  try  to  ensure  that  the  primary  interests 
have  decisive  weight  in  the  professional  decisions  an 
individual or institution make.  Conflicts of interest are 
thus quite different from the conflicts between primary 
interests, which are more like the familiar dilemmas of 
medical  ethics,  in  which  neither  value  can  be  said  in 
advance to have priority.    
Secondary interests include the desire for professional 
advancement,  recognition  for  personal  achievement, 
favors to friends and family, assistance to one’s students 
and colleagues, and most saliently financial gain. Con-
flict  of interest rules  typically focus  on financial gain, 
not because it is more corrupting than the other inter-
ests but because it is relatively more objective, fungible, 
and  quantifiable.  It  is  therefore  more  effectively  and 
fairly  regulated  than  other  secondary  interests.  Most 
secondary interests including financial gain are perfectly  
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legitimate (even desirable) goals within limits. The 
secondary interests are objectionable only when they 
have greater weight than the primary interest in pro-
fessional decisions.   
The conflict is not an occurrence but a set of cir-
cumstances that create or increase a risk that primary 
interests will be compromised as a result of the pur-
suit of secondary interests.  The claim that there is a 
conflict of interest expresses a tendency. It is based 
on  common  past  experience:  we  have  learned  that 
under  certain  circumstances  professional  judgment 
about  a primary interest is at  risk of being unduly 
influenced by a secondary interest. Rules that control 
this danger, even if the threat is actualized in rela-
tively few cases, are intended to protect against this 
risk. Therefore, a conflict of interest exists whether 
or not a particular individual or institution is actually 
unduly influenced by the secondary interest.  In any 
particular  case,  individuals  may  be  said  to  have  a 
conflict  of  interest  even  though  their  decisions  do 
not  actually  impede  primary  professional  goals  or 
violate primary professional obligations.  
 
The Purposes of Conflict of Interest Policies 
Institutions,  professional  organizations,  and  gov-
ernments on behalf of the public establish policies to 
address  the  problem  of  conflict  of  interest.    The 
policies try to ensure that professional decisions are 
made on the basis of primary, not secondary inter-
ests.    To  the  extent  that  they  are  effective  in  this 
general goal,  they serve two more specific purposes.  
First, the policies help maintain the integrity of 
professional judgment.  [8] [9] Bias is the most sali-
ent way in which integrity can be compromised [10] 
[11].  Violations  of  other  standards  of  professional 
practice such as timely publication of research, fair 
treatment of students and post-docs,  and  openness 
with patients are also risks. The policies do not as-
sume that any particular professional will necessarily 
let financial gain influence his or her judgment. The 
policies seek to minimize the risk of undue influence by 
secondary interests, most prominently personal financial 
gain, that should be irrelevant to the merits of decisions 
about  the  conduct  of  research,  teaching,  and  patient 
care.  
Second, the policies help sustain public confidence 
in  professional  judgment.  [12]  Here  the  point  is  to 
minimize or eliminate circumstances that would cause 
reasonable  persons  to  suspect  that  professional  judg-
ment has been improperly influenced, whether or not it 
has. The public includes not only patient and research 
subjects, who may have other concerns on their mind, 
but legislators, foundation heads, editorial writers and 
other opinion  leaders. To the extent that the public and 
public officials distrust the profession, they are likely to 
demand greater external regulation, and to supply fewer 
resources for its primary activities. When an individual 
professional acts in ways that lead to distrust, the con-
sequences may affect colleagues, patients, and the insti-
tution as a whole.  Similarly, institutional practices can 
be the source of distrust, with effects that may be even 
more damaging than those of individuals. Once trust is 
lost, it is difficult to restore. 
 
Misplaced Objections  
to Conflict of Interest Regulation 
Many objections have been raised against the increasing 
regulation of conflict of interest. [13] [14] [15]  But it is 
the application to individuals seems to provoke the most 
resistance. Individuals accused of  having a conflict of 
interest  often  say  that  they  would  never  let  financial 
interests  influence  their  decisions.    This  objection  to 
regulation misses the point. Because the conflict is a set 
of circumstances that refer to a generic risk rather than 
the individual decision in a particular case, the existence 
of a conflict of interest does not imply that any individ-
ual is improperly motivated. Still, an individual might 
still object that it is not fair to generalize in this way: 
look at my actual decisions and my eminent reputation.  
However, conflict of interest rules are by their nature  
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designed to avoid the need to investigate individual 
cases in this way. For at least two reasons they are 
not directed to the motives in a particular case. 
First,  it  is  improperly  intrusive  to  conduct  the 
kind of investigation that would be necessary to de-
termine how much influence each of the various in-
terests had in a professional decision in any particu-
lar case. Fair hearings could not be held and reliable 
conclusions  reached  without  risking  violations  of 
rights of privacy of the many individuals who may be 
involved, and without distracting many people from 
their other more important work.  
Second, it is usually impossible for the potentially 
affected parties to determine with any degree of con-
fidence  that  a  particular  decision  was  improperly 
motivated.  Generally, there are multiple considera-
tions that affect judgment in medical decisions. Citi-
zens,  students,  physicians,  researchers,  and  others 
who are affected by the decision but do not know 
the  decision  maker  are  not  in  a  position  to  assess 
motives in particular cases. Even if they did know 
the decision maker, they would find it virtually im-
possible  to  determine  whether  secondary  interests 
motivated  a  decision.  The  decision  makers  them-
selves are not always fully aware of their motivations. 
Another,  closely  related, objection is sometimes 
raised against a claim that an individual has a con-
flict  of  interest.    This  objection  agrees  that  we 
should ignore motives but denies that the conditions 
under which decisions are made is relevant to assess-
ing the professional’s conduct. Judge my decision—
the results of the research, the content of the lecture, 
the prescription of the drug—not my financial inter-
ests.    Again  the  problem  is  that  many  people  af-
fected by professional decisions are not in a position 
to judge their validity. Those who are competent to 
judge may not be able to do so until after the dam-
age  has  been  done.    Furthermore,  the  objection 
completely ignores one of the main purposes of con-
flict  of  interest  policies—maintenance  of  public 
trust. Even valid decisions and honest research may not 
be  widely  accepted  as  such  if  they a r e  m a d e  o r  c o n-
ducted  under  conditions  in  which  secondary  interests 
are prominent.  
 
The Misuse of “Appearance” in Conflict of Interest 
Conflict of interest policies should not state that profes-
sionals should avoid  “even the appearance of a conflict 
of interest.”  All conflicts of interest involve perceptions 
or appearances because they are specified from the per-
spective of people who do not have sufficient informa-
tion to assess the actual motives of a decision maker and 
the effects of these motives on the decisions themselves. 
Contrasting actual with perceived conflicts leads to two 
problems. 
First, the contrast encourages the mistaken idea that 
the appearance is not as bad as the actual conflict. It 
undermines the rationale for prohibiting any conflict of 
interest because it suggests that there is no conflict un-
less the decision maker was actually motivated to favor 
secondary over primary interests. When a professional’s 
judgment is actually distorted by acceptance of a gift or 
the prospect of stock options, the violation is no longer 
simply a conflict of interest but emphatically the victory 
of  the  wrong  interest.  It  becomes  another,  different 
kind of offense, one that may involve negligence, abuse 
of power, scientific misconduct or even dishonesty and 
bribery. 
Second,  separating  appearances  from  real  conflicts 
leads  to o v e r l y  b r o a d  a n d  e x c e s s i v e l y  s u b j e c t i v e  r u l e s ,  
which can be used to raise questions about conduct that 
is perfectly proper. With a loose notion of perception or 
appearance,  circumstances  that  are  suspicious  only  to 
uninformed people or muckraking reporters can be the 
basis of indiscriminate charges of conflicts of interest. 
Charges of conflicts of interest should be limited to cir-
cumstances  specified  by  rules  that  are  objectively 
grounded in past experience and interpreted by reason-
able persons on the basis of relevant and publicly avail-
able facts.  
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Standards for Assessing Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts are not binary. They can be more or less 
severe. The severity of a conflict depends on (1) the 
likelihood that professional decisions in the relevant 
circumstances tend to be unduly influenced by a sec-
ondary interest; and (2) the seriousness of the harm or 
wrong that could result from such influence.  Both 
of these assessment are based not mainly on the par-
ticular case in question, but on other cases in similar 
circumstances. 
 
Severity of conflict of interests 
 
Likelihood of Undue 
Influence 
Seriousness of Harm or 
Wrong 
 
Value of  
Secondary Interest 
 
Value of  
Primary Interest 
 
Scope of Conflict 
 
Scope of Consequences 
 
 
Extent of Discretion 
 
Extent of Accountability 
 
 
In assessing the likelihood, we may assume that 
within a standard range the greater the value of the 
secondary interest (e.g. the size of the financial gain), 
the more probable its influence. Although absolute 
value  is  important,    the  secondary  interest  should 
generally be measured relative to typical income for 
the relevant class of professionals, and relative to the 
scale of the practice, projects and institutional budg-
ets.  
Scope of conflict refers to the duration and depth of 
the relationship that generates the conflict. Longer 
and  closer  associations  increase  the  scope.  A  con-
tinuing  relationship  as  a  member  of  the  board  or 
limited partner, for example, creates a more serious 
problem than the acceptance of a one-time grant or 
gift.  Consulting  agreements  that  extend  for  years  or 
honoraria that cover years of speaking are more prob-
lematic.    Likewise,  serving  on  a  company’s  scientific 
advisors board that more intimately ties the professional 
to the fate of the company is more likely to affect judg-
ment than occasionally speaking for the company.   
The extent of discretion—how much latitude a profes-
sional enjoys in the making of major decisions—partly 
determines  the  range  of  the  probabilities.  The  more 
closely the research methods follow conventional prac-
tice, the less room there is for judgment, and hence for 
improper influence. Also, the less independent author-
ity the professional has in a particular case, the less lati-
tude there is for improper influence. A conflict involv-
ing a lab technician, for example, is generally less severe 
than  one  involving  a  principal  investigator.  A  profes-
sional may also enjoy less independent authority if there 
is  a  large  team  overseeing  the  research  trial  and  a 
mechanism for external auditing.  
In assessing the seriousness of a conflict, we should 
consider first the value of the primary interest. This value 
consists of both benefits and costs. Some relationships 
that present a conflict of interest also advance the pri-
mary aims of science and medicine and thus the primary 
aims  of  medical  and  scientific  professionals.  In  some 
situations,  it  may be necessary  to  accept a  conflict  of  
interest  in order to advance a primary interest. For ex-
ample, allowing a scientist who is the primary discov-
erer and patent holder of a promising new intervention 
to participate in designing  a clinical trial may be the 
only  way  to  ensure  that  the  results  are  scientifically 
valid. 
At  the  same  time,  these  commercial  relationships 
can  undermine  the  very  primary  values  that  they  are 
intended to promote. They can have damaging effects 
on  the  integrity  of  the  research,  teaching,  or  clinical 
practice.  In weighing these costs, we should consider 
the possibility of harm to the subjects, students and pa-
tients,  damage  to  the  objectivity  of  the  research  and  
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education, and the loss of confidence  in  the judg-
ment  of  the  individual  professional  and  collabora-
tors.   
The greater the scope of consequences, the more se-
rious the conflict. Beyond its impact on the research 
of a particular individual, a conflict may have effects 
on the research and teaching of colleagues.  A drug 
company’s  sponsorship  of  a  research  project  could 
raise about the work of other researchers in the insti-
tution,  and  weaken  their  ability  to  raise  funds  for 
other sources.  A professor’s close connections with 
industry could not only raise doubts about the objec-
tivity  of  his  classes  (for  example,  discounting  his 
criticisms of industry because of suspicions that he is 
overcompensating for his relationships). It could also 
have negative effects on the careers of his teaching 
assistants, and the collegial culture of the institution.   
Finally, a conflict is more serious the less exten-
sive  the  accountability  of  the  educator,  physician or 
researcher.  If  the  decision  of  a  physician  is  re-
viewable  by  colleagues  or  authorities  (who  do  not 
themselves have conflicts of interest), then there is 
less  cause  for  concern.  But  the  reviewers  must  be 
genuinely independent and effective.  
Even if professionals are accountable for particu-
lar decisions, however, they may escape scrutiny for 
the cumulative effects and for the broader policy im-
plications  of  their  decisions.  The  informal  norms 
and policies of a hospital or HMO represent judg-
ments that, no less than explicit decisions in particu-
lar cases, may be improperly influenced by secondary 
interests. Similarly, the peer review process is a bet-
ter check on the results of particular research projects 
than  it  is  on  the  direction  and  significance  of  the 
research enterprise as a whole. 
 
Procedures for  
Dealing with Conflicts of Interest 
The standards should guide the choice of procedures 
and the way in which they are deployed. In general, 
the more severe the conflict, the more rigorous the pro-
cedures should be. Three major types of procedure are 
commonly used to deal with conflicts of interest: disclo-
sure, management and prohibition.  
 
Disclosure 
Disclosure is intended to give people who may be af-
fected  by  professional  decisions  the  information  they 
need  to  assess  whether  those  decisions  are  consistent 
with  the  primary  interest.  The  key  question  is:    who 
should disclose what to whom?  
The standard for disclosure should be what the af-
fected persons should want to know to assess the sever-
ity of the conflict of interest.  Specifically, information 
should be disclosed that is relevant to evaluating to the 
value and scope of the interests and the extent of discre-
tion and accountability (see the table above ). Although 
there is no systematic evidence regarding the relation-
ship between the level of remuneration and the risk of 
bias,  it  is  reasonable  to  require  disclosure  in  order  to 
address public confidence. 
Disclosure may be necessary but it is usually not suf-
ficient. There is great variation in how disclosure is im-
plemented. [16]  The people affected by the decisions 
may not be able to do anything about the disclosure. 
Patients, students and the public may have no way of 
assessing what the disclosure means, and no alternatives 
if they were  to  conclude that  disclosed  conflict is not 
acceptable.  As  a  result  of  disclosure,  patients  and  re-
search subjects may become  more trusting even when 
they should be wary. Furthermore, disclosure can un-
dermine public confidence in professional activity if it is 
not combined with other procedures. This point is es-
pecially important in the case of institutional conflicts 
of  interest.  The  risk  of  compromising  the  mission  of 
medical schools and research institutes in the pursuit of 
financial gain for the institution has grown faster than 
the procedures for dealing with it. [17]  
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Management  
Management techniques are necessary when disclo-
sure is inadequate and prohibition of the activity is 
not  a  desirable option because the participation  of 
the  conflicted  professional  is  necessary).  Manage-
ment  may include  divestiture of financial interests, 
creation of blind trusts, assigning a colleague with-
out a conflict to obtain the informed consent from 
research  participants,  limiting  participation  of  the 
conflicted professional in the project or practice to 
areas where he or she has unique expertise, and es-
tablishing an independent oversight body. However, 
management  turns  into  simply  permitting  unless 
sustained and independent oversight procedures are 
put in place. 
 
Prohibition 
With this procedure, the professional who has a se-
rious conflict of interest is not permitted to partici-
pate  in  the  activity  in  question.  Prohibition  must 
usually operate in conjunction with  disclosure. We 
do not know what to prohibit until the financial in-
terests are disclosed at least to someone in authority. 
Prohibition  may  refer  to specific  individuals  but  it 
can also express a general policy. For example, a rule 
may state that no member of a committee develop-
ing  practice  guidelines  may  be  an  employee  of  a 
company that manufactures a drug or device covered 
by the guidelines. Prohibition can be administered in 
degrees: for example, a researcher who has a patent 
on the drug being tested in a clinical trial might not 
be  allowed  to  serve  as  principal  investigator  but 
might be  permitted to serve as a consultant about 
the  dosage  and  administration  of  the  drug;  or  the 
director of research at a biotech company might not 
be permitted to serve as the director of a continuing 
education course but might be invited to serve on a 
panel or program on recent developments in a clini-
cal specialty.  
 Although each of the procedures may be used alone, 
they are usually, and more effectively, combined in vari-
ous ways. For example, even when disclosure is not suf-
ficient —as is often the case—it may be still be essential 
as part of a comprehensive policy. Some level of disclo-
sure is necessary for both management and prohibition 
of conflicts of interests. 
 
Conclusion 
Medicine  today  faces  many  difficult  challenges—high 
costs  of  treatment,  lack  of  availability  of  insurance, 
prevalence  of  medical  error,  and  decline  of  financial 
support for research, among others. In comparison, the 
problem of conflict of interest may seem less significant. 
But  in  an  important  sense,  conflict  of  interest  is  the 
most serious challenge because none of the others can 
be  adequately  met  if  conflicts  are  not  well  managed. 
Dealing successfully with  the other problems  depends 
on the capacity of individuals and institutions to make 
decisions not mainly on the basis of commercial consid-
erations but on the basis  of the  essential goals of the 
medical profession. Failure to deal with the challenge of 
conflict of interest can undermine efforts to address the 
other serious problems the medical profession faces to-
day. 
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Addendum:  
Institutional Conflicts of Interest
* 
 
Institutional conflicts of interest arise when an insti-
tution’s own financial interests pose a risk to its pri-
mary interest in pursuing the mission of providing 
quality health care, medical education or clinical re-
search. Institutional conflicts typically appear when 
an the value of equity that an institution holds in a 
company, or a patent that the institution licenses to 
a  company,  can  be  affected  by  research  conducted 
within the institution. If the potential for financial 
return to the institution is significant, there is a risk 
that  the  primary  goals  of  the  institution  may  be 
compromised.  With  an  eye  toward  enhancing  the 
institution’s financial resources, institutional officials 
may  make  decisions  that  they  would  otherwise 
avoid—relaxing  rules,  allowing  exceptions,  making 
personnel  appointments,  or  allocating  resources  in 
ways that protect the institution’s investments more 
than its mission.  
The influence of the financial considerations may 
cumulative, sometimes not noticeable at first, as the 
priorities of the institution shift gradually over time 
in response to financial opportunities. Certain kinds 
of research or certain kinds of therapies may receive 
more attention than they would deserve if decisions 
were made strictly on the scientific and medical mer-
its.    
The problem of institutional conflicts has not re-
ceived as much attention as individual conflicts, but 
                                                 
* The distinction between institutional and individual 
conflicts of interest is not the same as the distinction 
between  institutional  and  individual  corruption.  In 
the  discussion  of  conflicts,  the  terms  (institu-
tional/individual) refer to the agents whose interests 
are in question, whereas in the discussion of corrup-
tion the terms refer to the forms that the influence 
takes. Thus, individual conflicts can be instances of 
institutional  corruption  (as  when  an  individual  re-
searcher receives support from a corporation for re-
search in his lab rather than for his personal profit).  
its consequences can be at least as damaging—in some 
cases  more  damaging  in  the  long  run—than those  of 
individual conflicts. If not properly addressed, institu-
tional conflicts can undermine the work and reputation 
of the entire institution, including the members who are 
themselves strictly avoiding individual conflicts of inter-
est.  
Institutional conflicts of interest are in three respects 
more  difficult  to  deal  with  than  individual  conflicts. 
First, in the case of individual conflicts there are usually 
opportunities for review at multiple levels of the institu-
tion by authorities who are relatively independent and 
do not themselves stand to gain from the secondary in-
terests. In the case of institutional conflicts, it is more 
difficult to establish oversight that is truly independent. 
Everyone potentially stands to gain, often the highest 
authorities most  of  all. The reputation  and  tenure  of 
chief executives and other high officials often depends 
on their success in improving the financial health of the 
institution, even if profit is not the aim. Professionals 
and staff at all levels may be reluctant to question prac-
tices that seem to be improving the institution’s finan-
cial welfare.  
Second, the potential gain from a secondary interest 
is not personal in  the same  way  as  it  is in individual 
conflicts. The officers of the institution do not directly 
profit  from  the  institution’s i n v e s t m e n t s  ( t h o u g h  o f  
course as noted their careers may be affected by their 
success in this area). Their decisions can be more easily 
rationalized as serving the institution rather than them-
selves. And in fact the financial gains often do serve the 
institution’s  primary  mission.    Returns  on  the  invest-
ments may be distributed to worthy research, education 
and practice. But it is precisely because this claim is so 
plausible (and it often valid) that the serious conflicts 
are ignored or downplayed. No one is inclined to un-
dertake  a  careful  and  continual  review  to  determine 
whether all the secondary interests are actually serving 
or undermining the primary interests of the institution.   
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Third, for a similar reasons, the public may ini-
tially be more tolerant of these conflicts than indi-
vidual conflicts, which in turn may make the institu-
tional  leaders  less  concerned  about  them.  As  the 
authors  of  an  important  comment  on  institutional 
conflicts  write: “society recognizes  that  health  care 
institutions need to obtain funds to carry out their 
missions and sanctions institutional pursuit of such 
funding. Society may not view this as self-interested 
behavior and consequently may erroneously be more 
tolerant  of  circumstances  in  which  an  institution's 
financial interests may compromise the integrity of 
its missions than of similar situations involving indi-
vidual conflict of interest.” [18]  
Because  no  decision  maker  in  an  institution  is 
fully free of conflict in the case of institutional con-
flicts, it is not possible to establish a fully independ-
ent process for assessing such conflicts. That diffi-
culty  has  led  some  to  suggest  that  more  rigorous 
regulation  by  government  is  necessary.  But  such 
regulation has its own familiar difficulties. It is by no 
means clear that the government officials are better 
positioned  to  understand  the  primary  mission  of 
these institutions, and to strike the delicate balance 
between  encouraging  commercial  relationships  be-
tween industry and health care institutions, and pro-
tecting the integrity of research, practice and educa-
tion.  
Although there is no  perfect solution, the  most 
suitable authority for making judgments about insti-
tutional  conflicts  is  the  board  of  trustees,  or  the 
equivalent  governing  body.  In  their  fiduciary  role, 
members of the board are responsible for giving pri-
ority to the longer term interests of the institution. 
Standing  at  greater  distance  from  the  day  to  day 
pressures  of  decision  making,  they  can  more  judi-
ciously assess the impact of the financial interests on 
the institution’s  core mission. They have access  to 
more comprehensive information about the finances 
of the institution,  some of which may be confiden-
tial. They are also better positioned  to  help the  chief 
executive resolve disputes about conflict of interest be-
tween  schools  and  other  units  within  the  institution. 
(The school of public  health, for  example,  may  think 
that investments in certain products create a more seri-
ous risk to the whole institution than does say the busi-
ness school.) More generally, the decisions of a Board 
are  more  salient  within  and  beyond  the  institution. 
When the Board takes up an issue, the concerned public 
is more likely to take notice.   
Boards are more likely to take seriously their respon-
sibility for institutional conflicts if their members have 
direct responsibility for ensuring that these conflicts do 
not undermine the long term primary interests of the 
institution. They should establish their own committee, 
partially on the model of the audit committee, charged 
with regularly reviewing the impact of the institution’s 
financial relationships on its core mission.  The com-
mittee should include members who do not themselves 
have any conflicts, and at least one person who is com-
pletely  independent  of  the  board  and  the  institution. 
The  committee sh o u l d  s u bmi t  a  fo rm a l  re po r t  t o  t he 
board  each  year,  analyzing  the  institution’s  financial 
relationships that may affect the institution’s core activi-
ties, and the ways in which the institution is managing 
any conflicts. The  report should be made available to 
the  public,  to  the  extent  consistent  with  the  require-
ments of confidentiality. In large institutions, the com-
mittee  may find it  helpful to have the assistance of a 
working committee, composed of professionals and staff 
within the institution, which would conduct more fre-
quent reviews and special investigations. Such a com-
mittee should report directly to the Board’s committee.  
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